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RULES FOR DETERMINING WHAT IS INVENTION*
ROBERT A. BUCKLES, JR.t
INTRODUCTIONT HE laws of the United States provide for the encouragement of
inventors and the promotion of technological advances through the
issuance of patents for new and useful inventions.' Authority for these
laws is found in the constitutional provision:
"The Congress shall have Power ... To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries. ... 2
The latest statute, The Patent Act of 1952, which became effective in
1953, provides: "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor .... 3
The courts have long held that there is no distinction between the
terms "invention" and "discovery" as recited in the Constitution, and
as these terms are used in patent law.4 The difficult question for patent
attorneys and the courts is: "What is invention"? The meaning of this
term has never been positively defined by Congress or by the courts.
Instead, invention has always been defined negatively, that is, by state-
ments of what is not invention.
As used in patent law the term invention includes two elements:
first, the process or product which is invented; and second, and more
difficult of definition, the creative act of the inventor. Perhaps as good
a positive definition as can be devised is given by Black's Law Diction-
ary, which defines invention in patent law as:
"the act or operation of finding out something new; the process of contriving and
producing something not previously known or existing, by the exercise of independent
investigation and experiment."
However, this attempt at a positive definition of invention omits some
qualifications and limitations imposed by the patent statutes and by
the courts.
* This article is adapted from the author's forthcoming book, Ideas, Inventions and
Patents-How To Develop and Protect Them, which will be published by John Wiley
& Sons, Inc., New York.
'I Member of the New York bar.
1. 35 U.S.CA. §§ 1-293 (1954).
2. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
3. 35 U.S.C.A. § 101 (1954).
4. In re Kemper, 14 Fed. Cas. 286, No. 7687 (C.C.D.C. 1841).
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OBVIOUSNESS
One test of invention provided by the revised statute is that of
obviousness. Even though one may devise a new machine or process or
product which has never before existed, if all of the elements of the
machine, steps of the process or parts of the product are old, and if no
unexpected results or functions obtain, he may not have made an
invention. In order to constitute an invention there must be not merely
something new but something out of the ordinary.' In other words, if
the new thing produced is merely a result of routine engineering or
design, and if it would have been obvious to anyone "ordinarily skilled
in the art"7 to produce the thing in the manner disclosed, then it does not
rise to the dignity of invention.
A patent decision in the District of Columbia indicates the courts'
view of what constitutes the dignity of invention:
"Inventions are somewhat like precious jewels, whose value is indicated not so
much by size as by brilliance. If a mechanical change or routine adjustment produces
merely a mechanical or routine result it is not invention, even though it is improve-
ment. But if a change or adjustment produces an extraordinary result, then the
change or adjustment takes on something of the character of the accomplishment.
" .... The extraordinary nature of an accomplishment implies an extraordinary
use or application of the ordinary implements and a more profound understanding
of the science, art or craft; and if the use or application is original and useful, it is
invention. If the trend of the teaching of prior art had been against such use for the
desired result,... then that is additional proof of invention. A sound public policy
supports the provision of the patent law to promote the progress of science by
securing to inventors the exclusive right to their 'discoveries.' ,8
The district court reversed the Patent Office and ordered the Commis-
sioner to issue a patent to the plaintiff on his invention of a colored
fluorescent material having means to filter ultraviolet rays, whereby the
5. 35 U.S.CA. § 103 (1954): "A patent may not be obtained though the invention is
not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the
subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made
to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter partains. Patent-
ability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made."
6. Knaust Bros., Inc. v. Goldschlag, 28 F. Supp. 18S, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1939), afi'ds 119
F.2d 1022 (2d Cir. 1941).
7. The meaning of the term "ordinary skil of the art" has never been finally reolved,
but it is clear from many decisions (since Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.)
248 (1850)) that this does not mean merely that skill possesed by an ordinary mechanic
(unless the invention is an ordinary mechanical one). Rather, this term of art apparently
is intended to mean the ordinary or routine skill of a scientist, designer, or engineer who is
fully qualified for professional work in the particular art to which the subject matter of
the invention relates. See 2 Robinson, Patents § 4SS (1890); 2 Walker, Patents 746-49
(Deller ed. 1937). See also Sinclair Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1945).
S. Switzer v. Marzall, 105 F. Supp. 841, 842-43 (D.D.C. 1952).
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colors -would not fade so readily when the material was exposed to day-
light. Even though the plaintiff's fluorescent material was old in the art,
and filters opaque to ultraviolet light were also old in other arts, the
court held that plaintiff's combination of a colorless ultraviolet light
absorber in connection with fluorescent dyed filaments was an invention.
In other words this combination was held not to be obvious, as the Patent
Office had contended.
In a more recent decision by the same court9 the Patent Office was
ordered to issue a patent to the plaintiff on his invention of threaded
connectors for joining oil well drill collars and drill pipe, where the
essential feature was merely the use of screw threads in which the angle
between adjacent sloping sides of each thread was ninety degrees, as
contrasted with the sixty-degree crest angle of the prior art. The Patent
Office had refused a patent on the ground that the substitution of ninety
degrees for the prior sixty-degree crest angle was obvious and did not
amount to invention, particularly in view of prior use of ninety-degree
threads in other arts on solid rods rather than on pipes. The court found,
however, that though the change was simple, the effect was a striking im-
provement in the art of deep well drilling, inasmuch as the ninety-degree
threads did not strip or break at great depths as the sixty-degree threads
of the prior art had done. The district court also found that ". . . the
plaintiff expended a great deal of effort and money to accomplish the
desired result"'" and, furthermore, that the problem which he solved was
one that had long plagued the oil industry. By implication, the plaintiff's
solution was not obvious to those skilled in this art, as evidenced by their
failure to discover it even though the need was very great. Hence this
was held to be a patentable invention."
Whether a new development is an obvious one is a question which is
incapable of determination in the abstract. The particular facts and cir-
cumstances surrounding each new development must be considered and
weighed as a whole. The question of obviousness should be judged as of
the time the invention is made, in the light of the then existing knowl-
edge and state of the art.'" This test imposes a particularly difficult
burden upon judges who may be called upon to determine the validity of
a patent many years after an invention is made. In such circumstances,
hindsight often affords the court a poor view of the inventor's foresight
at the time of making his contribution to the art. The courts are far from
infallible in applying this test.
9. Evans v. Watson, 142 F. Supp. 225 (D.D.C. 1956).
10. Id. at 228.
11. Patent No. 2,772,899 (Dec. 4, 1956).
12. Scilken v. Leonard's Catering, Inc., 149 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1945); Lakeshlre Cheese
Co. v. Shefford Cheese Co., 72 F.2d 497 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 616 (1934).
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A good illustration of this problem is Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. v.
United States,13 decided by the Supreme Court in 1943. This case in-
volved a number of basic patents on radio, for the infringement of which
the patent owners commenced action against the United States Govern-
ment in 1916. The Marconi patent' 4 was issued on June 28, 1904, upon
an application filed on November 10, 1900. Litigation of the controversy
was interrupted and delayed by two World Wars, and when the case
finally reached the Supreme Court, forty years later, a majority of the
justices held the broad claims of the Marconi patent to be invalid for
lack of invention. This determination hinged upon the question of
whether M'arconi's creation of wireless telegraphy was the result of
inventive skill or "ordinary skill in the art." Three justices dissented.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his dissenting opinion stated:
"It is an old observation that the training of Anglo-American Judges ill fits them
to discharge the duties cast upon them by patent legislation.
C'
"The real question is how significant a jump is the new disclosure from the old
knowledge. Reconstruction by hindsight, making obvious something that was not at
all obvious to superior minds until someone pointed it out,-this is too often a tempt-
ing exercise for astute minds. The result is to remove the opportunity of obtaining
what Congress has seen fit to make available.
"The inescapable fact is that Marconi in his basic patent hit upon something
that had eluded the best brains of the time working on the problem of wireless
communication-Clerk Maxwell and Sir Oliver Lodge and Nikola Tesla."15
Mr. Justice Rutledge in a separate dissenting opinion stated further:
"Until now law has united with almost universal repute in acknowledging Marconi
as the first to establish wireless telegraphy on a commercial basis. Before his inven-
tion, now in issue, ether-borne communication traveled some eighty miles. He
lengthened the arc to 6,000. Whether or not this was 'inventive' legally, it was a
great and beneficial achievement. Today, forty years after the event, the Court's
decision reduces it to an electrical mechanic's application of mere skill in the art.
"By present knowledge, it would be no more. School boys and mechanics now
could perform what Marconi did in 1900. But before then wizards had tried and
failed. The search was at the pinnacle of electrical knowledge. There, seeking,
among others, were Tesla, Lodge and Stone, old hands and great ones. With them
was Marconi, still young as the company went obsessed with youth's zeal for the
hunt."16
The language of the dissenting opinions quoted above also indicates
one of the best tests for obviousness. That is, if a problem has long
existed without a satisfactory solution, and if a number of skilled workers
13. 320 U.S. 1 (1943).
14. Patent No. 763,772 (June 28, 1904).
15. 320 US. at 60-62.
16. Id. at 64-65.
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have endeavored to solve the problem but their efforts have met with less
than complete success, then whoever is the first to devise a satisfactory
solution has made an invention no matter how simple or obvious his
solution may appear by hindsight."7 On the other hand, if a number of
workers independently arrive at the same solution at about the same
time, these facts tend to indicate absence of invention and suggest instead
that the solution may have been obvious to those workers skilled in the
art.'8
It will be appreciated that early recognition of a problem, of a need
to accomplish an end or to improve the existing art, may be a very
important step in the act of invention. He who first perceives a problem
and conceives a complete solution may make an invention even before
others have given any serious consideration to possibilities of improve-
ment in that particular art. When this is the case, the question of
whether or not the invention was obvious may often be held in abeyance,
and the inventor may be well advised by his patent attorney to proceed
with a patent application, particularly if the invention is in a crowded
or highly competitive field. If others have made the same invention at
about the same time, Patent Office interferences may be declared with
their applications, and the question of who was first will thereby be
determined.
A NEW COMBINATION OF OLD ELEMENTS
A positive rule, to which the courts at least pay lip-service, is that a
new combination, even if it embody only old elements, may be inven-
tion.1" A recent decision in the District Court for the District of Columbia
has applied this rule affirmatively in a case where the inventor freely
admitted that there were no new elements in his invention, but never-
theless the court ordered the Patent Office to issue him a patent for his
new combination of old elements in a very useful device for pouring
molten steel.2" This invention comprised a portable hydraulic power
17. See notes 8 and 9 supra.
18. Wall Pump & Compressor Co. v. Gardner Governor Co., 28 F.2d 334, 339 (7th
Cir. 1928): "It is of much significance here that about the same time several Important
builders of such machines-without relation to each other, and, so far as the evidence
discloses, without knowledge of what Gardner or the others were doing-designed and
built machines which substantially embody the elements of the patent, without themselves
claiming to be inventors. Such a situation is instructively dealt with in section 25 of
Walker on Patents, where it is stated: 'The absence of invention may be established In
some cases, by evidence that a considerable number of persons who were not inventors,
acting independently of each other, and without receiving any information from the
patentee or his patent, did in fact contrive the improvement claimed therein, not long after
he produced it.'"
19. 1 Walker, Patents 147, 215, 224, 286 (Deller ed. 1937).
20. Carleton v. Watson, 113 U.S.P.Q. 431 (D.D.C. June 10, 1957).
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control, known commercially as "Autopour," for controlling the flow of
molten steel from the bottom of ladles. The inventor conceded that
bottom pouring ladles with vertical stoppers had been used throughout
the steel industry for fifty to seventy-five years and also that hydraulic
force devices similar to that incorporated in his disclosure had been used
in many different types of machines for some thirty years. But the
inventor contended, and the court agreed, that his adaptation of hydrau-
lic power for the purpose of controlling the ladle stoppers brought
radically new and different results by way of increased safety and
precision manipulation. More frequently, however, acknowledgement of
this concept appears in dissenting opinions,2 ' or in cases holding that the
particular subject matter does not constitute invention because it does
not represent a valid combination.-2 2
Inventions may be embodied in new machines which are combinations
of mechanical parts; or they may involve electrical circuits-as, for
example, radio circuits-which are combinations of electrical elements;
or they may embody a combination of chemical substances in a new
chemical composition; or a combination of steps in a new process. Even
a new part or element for use in a machine or in an electrical circuit
usually involves a combination of sub-elements when it is analyzed in
detail. The diode valve of Fleming and the triode tube of DeForest,
both of which are extensively used as elements in radio circuits, embody
a combination of sub-elements or parts. Similarly in chemical processes,
where a combination of steps or operations is performed to produce a
desired end result or product, one or more of the elemental steps of the
process may require a chemical compound which itself embodies a num-
ber of basic chemical elements in chemical combination.
ComimINATION V. AGGREGATION
Practically all inventions require a combination of one sort or another.
A crucial test of invention is whether the claimed invention is really a
valid combination or whether it is merely an aggregation. The courts
have long held that mere aggregation is not invention. 3
A frequently applied criterion of patentable combination is that the
elements must coact or cooperate, one with another, to produce the
desired useful result.2 4 This is not to say that all of the elements must
21. Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 56S (1949); Sinclair Co. v. Inter-
chemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 330 (1945).
22. Great AUt. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 US. 147 (1950);
Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.. 84 (1941); Rcckendorfer
v. Faber, 92 U.S. 347 (1875).
23. See notes 21 and 22 supra.
24. Independent Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Halliburton, 54 F.2d SO (10th Cir.)J, cert.
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be active at the same instant of time,25 nor that each element must
necessarily coact with every other element in the comination, 2 but all
of the elements must contribute in some way to a unitary end,27 and the
contribution of each element must be more than a mere additive effect.28
In other words, each element must be necessary to the operation of the
combination as a whole. This criterion of cooperation between elements
of a patentable combination applies whether or not the elements them-
selves are old.2
9
This concept has been variously stated by the courts ever since the
historic case of Reckendorfer v. Faber,3" in which the Supreme Court
declared invalid a patent on a lead pencil having an eraser affixed to one
end. The Court held that there was no cooperation, or joint action,
between the pencil and the rubber eraser, but rather that each performed
its own function in exactly the same way as they did before the separate
elements were joined in a single article of manufacture. In that case
the Court stated:
"The combination, to be patentable, must produce a different force or effect, or
result in the combined forces or processes, from that given by their separate parts.
There must be a new result produced by their union: if not so, it is only an aggrega-
tion of separate elements. An instance and an illustration are found in the discovery,
that, by the use of sulphur mixed with India rubber, the rubber could be vulcanized,
and that without this agent the rubber could not be vulcanized. The combination
of the two produced a result or an article entirely different from that before in use.
Another illustration may be found in the frame in a saw-mill which advances the
log regularly to meet the saw, and the saw which saws the log; the two co-operate
and are simultaneous in their joint action of sawing through the whole log: or in
the sewing-machine, where one part advances the cloth, and another part forms the
stitches, the action being simultaneous in carrying on a continuous sewing. . . . A
denied, 286 U.S. 544 (1932); United States Hoffman Mach. Corp. v. Pantex Pressing
Mach., Inc., 35 F.2d 523 (D. Del. 1929), modified on other grounds, 44 F.2d 685 (3d Cr.
1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 904 (1931).
25. See Independent Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Haliburton, supra note 24; International
Carbonic Engineering Co. v. Natural Carbonic Products, Inc., 57 F. Supp. 248 (S.D. Cal.
1944), aff'd, 158 F.2d 285 (9th Cir. 1946).
26. Michigan Carton Co. v. Sutherland Paper Co., 29 F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 1928);
Cusano v. Kotler, 64 F. Supp. 908 (D.N.J. 1946), aff'd, 159 F.2d 159 (3d Cr. 1947).
27. Sachs v. Hartford Elec. Supply Co., 47 F.2d 743 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 283 U.S.
854 (1931); Pickering v. McCullough, 104 U.S. 310 (1881); Application of Hobson, 33
C.C.PA. (Patents) 742, 152 F.2d 998 (1946).
28. Application of Trier, 35 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 701, 163 F.2d 575 (1947); In re Pinco,
33 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 1148, 156 F.2d 173 (1946); In re Plummer, 30 C.C.P.A. (Patents)
701, 130 F.2d 758 (1942); American Steel Wire Co. v. Coe, 105 F.2d 17 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
29. Great Aft. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950);
Lincoln Engineering Co. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 303 U.S. 545 (1938); Keystone Driller
Co. v. Northwest Engineering Corp., 294 U.S. 42 (1935).
30. 92 U.S. 347 (1875).
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double effect is produced or a double duty performed by the combined result. In
these and numerous like cases the parts co-operate in producing the final effect, some-
times simultaneously, sometimes successively. The result comes from the combined
effect of the several parts, not simply from the separate action of each, and is,
therefore, patentable." 31
In another case,' a lower court, following this authoritative rule of
the Supreme Court, stated the test thus:
"The test is whether the combination discloses a co-operation or a co-ordination of
the elements which, working together as a unit, although mayhap not simultaneously,
produces a new or better result."33
At least one judge has used an illustrative analogy which perhaps ex-
plains the distinction between inventive combination and mere aggrega-
tion more effectively than does the language of the Supreme Court:
"A rough analogy, that cannot be pressed too far, has repeatedly occurred to me in
considering this question. I think of a football team as a combination; one passes,
one receives, another blocks, another runs, and still others hold the line. Eleven men
are doing different things, each in his own way, and not always simultaneously; yet
they are working to a common end, to advance the ball; and they coact as a unit.
I think of a track team as an aggregation; one runs, another hurdles, another jumps,
another throws. They all work for a common general end, to amass points for their
alma mater; but there is lacking the vital spark of co-operation or co-ordination.
They work, not as one unit, but as several." 34
SUBSTITUTION OF EQUIVALENTS
Another rule of invention is that mere substitution of an equivalent
element in an old combination is not invention, unless a new and un-
expected result is obtained.33 This rule, like the others discussed above,
is more easily stated than it is applied, because the difficult question
arises as to what is an equivalent.
In some cases, of course, equivalency may be obvious, as, for example,
where a patented machine is operated by an internal combustion engine
it would not normally be invention to substitute an electric motor for
the gas engine. Or in the case of a mechanism employing spring loading
to maintain a desired relation between two parts, it would ordinarily not
be invention to substitute a weight for the spring so that the force of
gravity is employed to retain the desired relation. Similarly, if prior
inventors have employed hydraulic or pneumatic means in a particular
31. Id. at 357.
32. Skinner Bros. Belting Co. v. Oil Well Improvements Co., 54 F.2d 396 (10th Cir.
1931).
33. Id. at 898.
34. Id. at 898-99, by McDermott, J., quoted in Gray v. Texas Co., 75 F2d 606, 609
(Sth Cir. 1935).
35. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co. v. Davis, 102 U.S. 222 (ISSO).
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combination, it would ordinarily not be invention to substitute electric
or spring-powered means for the hydraulic or pneumatic means of the
prior art.
Clearly it is not invention in an old combination to substitute roller
bearings for a sleeve bearing, or ball bearings for roller bearings, al-
though the original developments of both roller bearings and ball bear-
ings were patentable inventions. 6 Nor is it invention to employ an
electrical lock-out device in lieu of a prior mechanical lock-out. This
was the holding of a district court in the case of Burt v. Bilofsky:31
"The question presented for determination is whether or not the patentee's im-
provement . . . was such an advance over the prior art as will support the claim to
patentable invention.... The substitution of an electrically operated lock-out device
for the mechanically operated lock-out device . . . required nothing more than the
expected ingenuity of a skilled mechanic....
"The purported invention of the respective claims in issue comprises nothing more
than an assemblage of old elements in a circuit in which these elements perform
no new or different function. It is well established that such assemblages are
patentable 'only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts.'"3
The Patent Office and the courts have evolved two general tests of
equivalency. First, do the two elements perform an identical function?
Second, do they perform that function in substantially the same way? 9
If the answers to both of these questions are in the affirmative, then the
elements are equivalents and there is no invention in substituting one
for the other. The same tests are applied in determining questions of
infringement, where the alleged infringement is not exactly the same as
the patented invention. 0
An example of a mechanical equivalent was an automatic margin
regulator for typewriters in which the defendant's infringing mechanism
had one member that combined the functions of two elements as disclosed
and claimed in the patent. The defendant's single element was held to
36. Pennington v. National Supply Co., 95 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1938).
37. 120 F. Supp. 822 (D.N.J. 1954).
38. Id. at 828 (emphasis added), citing: Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket
Equipment Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950); Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices
Corp., 314 U.S. 84 (1941); Lincoln Engineering Co. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 303 U.S.
545 (1938); Altoona Publix Theatres, Inc. v. American Tri-Ergon Corp., 294 U.S. 477
(1935); General Motors Corp. v. Estate Stove Co., 201 F.2d 645 (6th Cir. 1953); Pack-
wood v. Briggs & Stratton Corp., 195 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1952); Hutchinson Mfg. Co. v.
Mayrath, 192 F.2d 110 (10th Cir. 1951); Park-In-Theatres, Inc. v. Perkins, 190 F.2d 137
(9th Cir. 1951).
39. 1 Walker, Patents 258-59 (Deller ed. 1937).
40. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950) (holding
manganese to be the equivalent of the term "alkaline earth metal" in patent on welding
flux).
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be equivalent to the patentee's two elements, and hence constituted an
infringement. 41
NEW ELEMENT IN OLD COMBINATION
An old combination cannot be patented as a new invention by the
mere substitution of a new element in the combination, whether or not
the substituted element is novel' This maxim may appear self-evident,
and yet cases arise repeatedly in which patentees think they have in-
vented a new machine or device simply because they have improved one
part or element of a prior art mechanism.43
A leading case decided by the Supreme Court illustrates this situation.
In Bassick MJ g. Co. v. R. M. Hollingskead Co01 the plaintiff obtained
a patent on a device for lubricating automobile bearings. He claimed as
his invention a combination of a grease gun, a connecting hose, and a
type of coupler for connecting the hose to the bearing to be greased. The
Court found that grease guns with a connecting hose and different types
of couplers were old in the prior art, and therefore ruled that plaintiff
had not invented the combination which he claimed. All that he had
invented was the coupler. As this part could be manufactured and sold
separately from the grease gun and hose, the plaintiff was not allowed
to collect patent royalties on the complete assembly including hose and
grease gun, but only on the inexpensive coupling. A more obvious
example is that one cannot repatent an automobile simply by inventing
an improved carburetor, although one may obtain a valid patent on the
carburetor itself if it meets all the other tests of invention.
SUBSTITUTION OF MATERIALS
Yet another rule of invention, which is in reality another aspect of
the doctrine of equivalents, is that ordinarily mere substitution of one
material for another is not invention, even if the substituted material has
never been used in that combination before, unless a new function or
result is obtainedV4 If a device of the prior art has been made of metal,
it would ordinarily not be invention to make the same device of plastic.
However, if the substitution of plastic for metal produced a new result
which was not obvious or wholly to be expected from the known charac-
teristics of the material, then the substitution might constitute invention.
41. Royal Typewriter Co. v. Remington Rand, Inc., 16S F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1943).
42. Lincoln Engineering Co. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 303 US. 545 (1933); American
Steel Wire Co. v. Coe, 105 F.2d 17 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
43. See 69 CJ.S., Patents § 68 (1951) and cases cited in nn.90-91.
44. 298 U.S. 415 (1936).
45. Atlantic Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192 (1382); Schreiber v. Coe, 119 F2d 459
(D.C. Cir. 1941); Leibling Automotive Devices, Inc. v. Wildermuth, 104 F.2d 411 (2d Cir.
1939) ; In re Walters, 35 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 1160, 16S F.2d 79 (1943).
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It has been held that in the manufacture of gaskets, the substitution
of Thiokol synthetic for natural rubber was not invention.40 Yet in
United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. E. H. Ferree Co.4 7 it was held that the sub-
stitution of aluminum alloy for the cast iron arm of a shoe manufactur-
ing machine was invention. But in this case it appeared that others be-
fore the patentee had repeatedly tried to use aluminum for this part,
and that their efforts had failed because of the inability of their alumi-
num arms to withstand the heavy forces required in the machine. The
inventor's patent was upheld because he had devised a lightweight mem-
ber of aluminum alloy which successfully withstood the required forces.
CHANGE IN SIZE, DEGREE OR SPEED
Still another rule of invention is that merely changing the size, shape,
degree or speed of a thing is not invention, unless the change produces a
new mode of operation or a new function. Because of the complexity of
factual situations which frequently surround new developments in science
and technology, this simple rule is not always easy to apply. A penetrat-
ing analysis of the facts is frequently required.
The Supreme Court applied this rule in the case of DeForest Radio
Co. v. General Elec. Co.4" where the Court considered a patent claiming
an improvement in a high-vacuum radio tube having a higher degree of
vacuum than in tubes of the prior art. This was held to be a question of
degree and therefore not an invention. The Court found that the theo-
retical advantages of a complete vacuum had long been known to workers
in the art of making radio tubes, and that with the improvement in ap-
paratus for creating a better vacuum, superior vacuum tubes naturally
followed.
In Edison Elec. Light Co v. United States Elec. Lighting Co.,40 Thomas
A. Edison was held to have made an invention in the field of incandescent
lamps, even though the crux of his invention appeared to be the mere re-
duction of the diameter of the lamp filament to one-half its original size.
This change in filament size produced a new mode of operation and a new
result. The smaller diameter resulted in the increase of the electrical
resistance of the filament by a factor of four, decreasing the radiating
surface to half the former area, and thereby increasing the ratio of
resistance to radiating surface by a factor of eight, which change made
the incandescent lamp a practical operable device.
46. Wolverine Fabricating & Mfg. Co. v. Detroit Gasket & Mfg. Co., 148 F.2d 399 (6th
Cir. 1945).
47. 64 F.2d 101 (2d Cir. 1933).
48. 283 U.S. 664 (1931).
49. 52 Fed. 300 (2d Cir. 1892).
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ADDITION OR OMIssION OF PARTS
A corollary to the rule that aggregation is not invention is the rule
that the mere addition of parts to a device to constitute a difference in
structure from the prior art is not invention, unless the added parts co-
operate with the old structure to produce a new function or result.c" By
the same token, it is not invention to duplicate parts, elements or sub-
combinations of the prior art." For example, given the prior invention
of a radio receiver comprising a detector and one stage of audio amplifi-
cation suitable for radio reception by headphones, it would ordinarily not
be considered invention to add further stages of amplification to produce
a radio capable of loud speaker operation, even though no one had ever
built a radio with a loud speaker before.
An early case, in which a court held the addition or multiplication of
parts to be an invention,5 2 illustrates the exception to this rule. The
invention was in the field of water turbines for deriving power for mills,
and it comprised mounting two water propellers in proximity to each
other on the same vertical shaft. In the prior art only one propeller had
been used, and the downward thrust caused by the water striking the
propeller necessitated a heavy thrust bearing on the shaft, with an ac-
companying loss of power through friction. The inventor discovered that
by the addition of a second propeller, placed beneath the first, the water
passing through the turbine could be caused to produce an upward
thrust on the shaft to counteract the downward thrust of the first
propeller, and thereby reduce the bearing friction.
Similarly, the omission of parts from a prior art device is not ordinarily
an invention, unless by the omission an unexpected result is obtained. 3
However, if one part can be made to perform the functions of two or
more parts in the prior art device, and if the parts which have been
omitted had formerly been essential to the prior invention, then the
omission of parts may constitute a new combination which is a real
invention.5 4 In highly competitive industries, where price, size or weight
of a commercial product are significant factors, improvements in the art
50. Bassick Mfg. Co. v. R. A. Hollingshead Co., 293 U.S. 415 (1936).
51. Stirling Co. v. Standard Snuff Co., 137 Fed. 94 (C.C.M.D. Tenn. 1902) (patent
disclosed and claimed boiler construction having "a single mud drum'; defendant later
built boiler having two mud drums-this was no invention but was held to he an infringe-
ment of the prior patent.).
52. Parker v. Hulme, IS Fed. Cas. 1138, No. 10740 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1S49).
53. See note 40 supra.
54. Lambert Hoisting Engine Co. v. Lidgerwood Mfg. Co., 154 Fed. 372 (3d Cir. 1C07).
Where three separate elements in a prior device, each performing an individual function,
were supplanted in a later device by a single element which performed the functions of
all three, the single element was held not the equivalent of the three separate elements.
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are sometimes made by the omission of parts previously thought to be
essential, and where such omission was not obvious to others in the art
it may very well be patentable invention.
COMMERCIAL SUCCESS
Commercial success of a new development, device or product does
not necessarily prove that its concept amounted to invention, although
such success may be admitted as evidence," and in a proper case may tilt
the balance in favor of a finding of invention."
Of course, commercial success may be attributed to many other factors
than the inventor's solution of a long felt need in the art. It may be
due to fortuitous business connections, to intensive advertising promo-
tion, or to such economic factors as availability of materials or labor
at a cheap price. Because so many diverse factors may influence com-
mercial success, the general rule of the courts is that it should not be
determinative of the question of invention except in cases where the
issue of invention is itself in doubtY7
FURTHER RULES AND THEIR EXCEPTIONS
There are other limitations than those outlined above, but most of
these are corollaries of the foregoing rules. For example, it is ordinarily
not invention to make a device portable. 8 Neither is it invention to
produce an article or device which differs from the prior art only in
excellence of workmanship." Nor is it ordinarily invention to use an
old device for a new or analogous purpose.G0 However, the revised
patent statute6 expressly provides that a new use of a known process,
machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material is recognized
as an invention and may be patented as a new process, provided all the
other conditions of patentability are met.
ORDINARY SKILL OF THE ART
All of the rules of invention are tempered by recognized exceptions,
the fundamental rule being that it is invention to produce a new and
non-obvious function, or a new and unexpected result, whether or not
55. Cold Metal Process Co. v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp., 108 F.2d 322 (3d Cir. 1939).
56. Sampson-United Corp. v. Sears, Roebuck, & Co., 103 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1939).
57. DeForest Radio Co. v. General Elec. Co., 283 U.S. 664 (1931).
58. Hendy v. Golden State & Miners Iron Works, 127 U.S. 370 (1888); Ranco, Inc. v.
Gwynn, 128 F.2d 437 (6th Cir. 1942).
59. Automatic Devices Corp. v. Sinko Tool Mfg. Co., 314 U.S. 94 (1941).
60. Powers-Kennedy Contracting Corp. v. Concrete Mixing & Conveying Co., 282 U.S.
175 (1930).
61. 35 U.S.C.A. § 100(b) (1954).
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the means employed are individually new, so long as the invention is
beyond the ordinary skill of the art.
Lawyers and the courts, as an aid in measuring invention, have
adopted a hypothetical man who serves as a yardstick in patent cases,
very much in the same manner that the "reasonably prudent man"
serves in negligence cases. However, the patent lawyers' legendary man
must be more than reasonably prudent. He must be a paragon of
knowledge who has read everything that is published and knows every-
thing that is patented in the art throughout the world; he is that flaw-
lessly educated scientist who is designated "the man skilled in the art."
The test is very simply stated: if the subject matter was not obvious to
the man skilled in the art at the time it was discovered, it constitutes
invention. On the other hand, if it would have been obvious to this
fellow skilled in the art, then it is not invention. - This test is comforting
only because it is so easily stated. Its application is fraught with
difficulty.
One such difficulty is that the man skilled in the art is often allowed a
degree of foresight denied the less fortunate remainder of humanity.
In other words, in determining the obviousness or non-obviousness of
particular subject matter to this person hypothetically skilled in the art,
the courts know the result to be attained. It is far easier to find a route
to a particular place when one knows where he is trying to go. The one
who originally located the spot may have had no such predetermined
goal. Often it is the desirability of the particular goal and not the means
for its attainment which is non-obvious.
When it comes to determining invention in the trial of a patent case,
we find a federal judge, who, in all probability, is totally unskilled in
the technical art to which the patent pertains, deciding what one skilled
in that art, and having read and understood all pertinent prior publica-
tions, would have considered obvious, not as of the time of the trial but
as of the patentee's date of invention. This difficult decision poses a
tedious task not only for the judge but also for the attorneys who must
explain the technical facts of the case. This task, however, is not impos-
sible. It may be effectively accomplished through the aid of expert
witnesses.
THm VARIABLE STANDARD OF INVENTION
A greater difficulty today is the indeterminate level of the standard of
invention. Handling of "invention" as compared with "obviousness" is a
problem of long standing, and one which has seemed to defy helpful
judicial definition. In 1885, the United States Supreme Court stated that
invention as distinguished from obviousness appears "... to spring
62. See 69 C.J.S., Patents § 55 (1951) and cases cited in nn20-31.
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from that intuitive faculty of the mind put forth in the search for new
results, or new methods, creating what had not before existed, or bring-
ing to light what lay hidden from vision. .... "03 In 1891, without
measurable clarification, the Court defined invention as ". . . that
impalpable something which distinguishes invention from simple me-
chanical skill."" Despite the obvious difficulties in defining the inventive
concept, this test was applied for a number of years with considerable
success, and at a reasonably constant level.
Invention being incapable of absolute definition, and its presence or
absence being largely sensed rather than determined, the standard of
invention is necessarily a variable one. Whatever may be the difficulties
in sensing invention in mechanical or electrical cases, the difficulty in
chemical cases is compounded by the judicially accepted fact that reason-
ing by analogy is much more restricted in the chemical field. 3 Chemistry
is acknowledged to be an essentially experimental science with an ex-
tremely low rate of predictability as compared with other fields."0 Neither
chemistry nor any other exact science could long flourish on non-constant
standards, but patents got along quite well on that basis for some time.
For many years, with few exceptions, the standard of invention did not
depart far from a median line.
Then came the depression of the nineteen-thirties when, in searching
for the elusive key to economic deterioration, a substantial number of
politicians settled on the patent system as blamable for various and as-
sorted economic ills. Hearings by various government agencies were
conducted and reported.67 During this period there was considerable
change in judicial personnel, both in the Supreme Court of the United
States and the lower federal courts. There seems to have grown up, at
least in the Supreme Court, a feeling that a higher standard of invention
was required." In other words, that which had heretofore been non-
obvious to a hypothetical man skilled in the art must now be considered
obvious to him.
In 1941, the Supreme Court announced that subject matter to consti-
63. Hollister v. Benedict & Burnham Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 59, 72 (1885).
64. McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 427 (1891).
65. General Elec. Co. v. Laco-Phillips Co., 233 Fed. 96, 103 (2d Cir. 1916).
66. Dow Chemical Co. v. Coe, 132 F.2d 577 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
67. Hearings on the Investigation of Concentration of Economic Power Before the
Temporary National Economic Committee of Congress, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., pts. 2 and 3
(1938); Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Compulsory Licensing of the House Com-
mittee on Patents, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938).
68. Associate Justice Jackson, dissenting in Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S.
560, 572 (1949), stated that ". .. the only patent that is valid is one which this Court has
not been able to get its hands on."
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tute invention "must reveal the flash of creative genius. c9 This pro-
nouncement at the time created quite a flurry in the courts and among
the patent bar, since it seemed to render non-inventive all save the most
exceptional advancements in the art. But it was soon discredited by the
lower courts as a helpful guide.' However, in 1950 some members of
the Supreme Court, apparently still undaunted, in a dissenting opinion
sought to define invention as "to push back the frontiers of chemistry,
physics and the like."171 Thoughtful consideration of the decisions
demonstrates that judicial determination and appreciation of the stand-
ard of invention is clearly not a science, though it may be an art.
These judicial onslaughts have greatly increased the standard of the
expected skill of the art. While to a considerable extent they have con-
fused rather than clarified the situation, they have nevertheless resulted
in substantially increasing the standard of invention which the courts
apply today. It is generally the opinion of the patent bar that this trend
of increasing the standard of invention, which has been in progress for at
least twenty years, has now about expended its force and that at the
present time a plateau has been reached which will presumably not be
exceeded in the foreseeable future.72
In the revised patent statute73 which became effective in 1953, Con-
gress rebuffed the extreme doctrine of the Supreme Court that an inven-
tion must display a "flash of genius," or must "push back the frontiers
of science." The significance of this statutory change has not yet been
passed upon by the Supreme Court, but in the Second Circuit Judge
Learned Hand has in effect held that the revised Patent Act of 1952
lowered the standard of invention.74 Judge Frank, however, expressed
serious doubts about the correctness of Judge Hand's interpretation,7
while Judge Kalodner, in the Third Circuit, is ". .. inclined to accept
the sensitive observations of Judge Learned Hand as to the judicial
69. Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 91 (1941).
70. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit flatly refused to follow the "flash of
genius" test in one case, saying ".... [such test] would eliminate nearly all the advances of
history, in science, and in the field of mechanics. . . . [It] should be rejected not only
because it is incapable of acceptable definition but because it injects into the statute some-
thing not appearing therein." Chicago Steel Foundry Co. v. Burnside Steel Foundry Co.,
132 F.2d 812, 817 (7th Cir. 1943).
71. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 154
(1950).
72. Libert, Section 103 of the Patent Act and the Standard of Invention: Comments on
Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 3S J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 304 (1956).
73. 35 U.S.C.A. § 103 (1954), note 5 supra.
74. Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 224 F.2d 530 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
911 (1955).
75. Vermont Structural Slate Co. v. Tatko Bros. Slate Co., 233 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1956).
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tendency of recent years, even within the language of the older decisions,
to expect an indefinite 'more' of the proffered invention."7" All of the
circuits have not yet been heard from on this matter, and the decisions
of the lower courts to date show a wide area of disagreement on the
interpretation of section 103 of the Act as relating to the standard of
invention.77
Regardless of the difficulty of judicially determining what is invention,
we may well agree with the late Professor Whitehead that "the greatest
invention of the nineteenth century was the invention of the method of
invention.""8
76. R. M. Palmer Co. v. Luden's, Inc., 236 F.2d 496 (3d Cir. 1956).
77. Marans, Some Aspects of the Patent Act of 1952 as Interpreted by Recently
Published Decisions, 39 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 177 (1957).
78. Whitehead, Science and the Modem World 136 (1925).
